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SUMMARY: Recent research by Sharma, Sharma, Tanyi, and Cheng (2020) provides new insight
into directors serving on multiple public company audit committees. Specifically, they investigate

companies’ cost of equity capital. Their evidence suggests that serving on multiple audit
committees is viewed positively by investors up to a certain point, but beyond that point investors
become concerned. This turning point, on average, is 3.5 audit committees for retired directors and
1.5 audit committees for directors in full-time employment. These results have implications for
numerous stakeholders including investors, proxy advisors, boards, nominating committees, stock
exchanges, and policymakers. They also have implications for future research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mae West famously said, “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful!” While she may
have been right in some cases, serving on too many audit committees turns out not to be so

directors serving on multiple audit committees. The debate on directors serving on multiple boards
and board committees is yet to be resolved because practitioners and academics generally fall in
two camps. One side contends that simultaneously holding a few directorships provides directors
with unique opportunities to garner experience and expertise that fosters effective governance
(BRT 2003; Deloitte 2012; Sharma et al. 2020). The other view is that simultaneously holding
multiple directorships can overburden and distract directors, thereby resulting in ineffective
governance (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Sharma and Iselin
2012; Sharma et al. 2020). These contentions also apply to key director responsibilities such as
serving as the chair of the audit committee or a designated financial expert.
In informing this debate, Sharma et al. (2020) identify a serious disconnect between
practice and academic research. While stakeholders in practice primarily focus on an individual
director’s simultaneous multiple director positions, academic research has largely focused on the
average number of directorships held by the entire board or board committee. Sharma et al. (2020)
investigate whether investors are concerned about an individual director simultaneously serving
on multiple audit committees, and whether their concerns vary dependent on the employment
status of the director and indicators of the firm’s governance effectiveness.
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wonderful. Until Sharma, Sharma, Tanyi, and Cheng (2020), there was no research on individual

How Many Simultaneous Audit Committee Memberships Are Too Many?
II. BACKGROUND
The impact of service on multiple audit committees could be positive or negative based on
two equally dominant yet opposing theoretical perspectives: the reputational perspective and the
busyness perspective. The reputational perspective suggests that the effectiveness of the audit

on multiple audit committees (Fama and Jensen 1983; BRT 2003; Ferris et al. 2003). A major task
of the audit committee is to monitor and oversee the quality of a firm’s financial reporting and
serving on multiple audit committees could increase this specialized knowledge base and enhance
directors’ governance capabilities and effectiveness (BRT 2002; U.S. House of Representatives
2002; NACD 2010, 2011). If investors interpret a director’s service on multiple audit committees
in this vein, then they might reward a firm with a lower cost of equity capital for a perceived
increase in the audit committee’s governance effectiveness.
The busyness perspective suggests that service on multiple audit committees decreases the
governance effectiveness of directors because the directors are overburdened and distracted (Ferris
et al. 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Field et al. 2013). If investors perceive this to be the case,
then they could penalize a firm for a perceived decrease in audit committee effectiveness with a
higher cost of equity capital.
Sharma et al. (2020)’s investigation is directed at determining which theoretical
perspective dominates investors’ perspectives. Although a modest number of studies examine the
impact of multiple directorships of board and audit committee members, their results are unclear
and conflicting, and they generally do not consider the impact of the effects of corporate
governance effectiveness. For example, Beasley (1996) and Sharma and Iselin (2012) find that
multiple directorships reduce board and audit committee governance of financial misreporting, but
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committee increases through knowledge, experience, and expertise directors garner from serving

How Many Simultaneous Audit Committee Memberships Are Too Many?
Barua, Rama, and Sharma (2010) and Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi (2010) observe no such
effects. In addition, while Ahn, Jiraporn, and Kim (2010) and Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013)
report that service on multiple boards has a positive impact on firm performance, Fich and
Shivdasani (2006) and Cashman, Gillan, and Jun (2012) observe detrimental effects.

that none of the prior multiple director studies adopt a design to examine an individual director’s
other board or audit committee seats. Notably, Sharma et al. (2020) is the first academic study to
emphasize that investors and other stakeholders typically focus on an individual director’s capacity
to serve on multiple audit committee and board positions, as opposed to the focus of extant research
being a board’s average capacity (please see Sharma et al. (2020) for details). This is most apparent
during director elections and from the demands of activists and governance advisors calling for
limits to the number of board and audit committee seats occupied by an individual director (Glass,
Lewis & Co. 2018). Even the stock exchange rules refer to an individual director’s capacity to serve

in directorial roles (NYSE 2014). Further, Sharma et al. (2020) use firms’ cost of equity capital to
measure investor sentiment regarding multiple audit committee appointments. Prior to their study,
only one other academic study evaluated the relationship between average board-level measures
of multiple directorships and investor sentiment using cost of equity capital as a proxy (Dao,
Huang, and Zhu 2013).
III. RESEARCH METHOD AND RESULTS
Research Method
Using a sample of over 34,000 directors spanning 12 years (2004 to 2015), Sharma et al.
(2020) employ regression analysis to evaluate the relationship between the cost of equity capital
and the number of audit committees an individual audit committee member serves on. Sharma et
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Following a comprehensive review of the related literature, Sharma et al. (2020) identify
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al.’s (2020) regression equation includes a comprehensive set of control variables to account for
other relevant factors that may be associated with the cost of equity capital. They also specifically
control for the number of boards an audit committee member serves on because not all board
members serve on audit committees, which helps isolate the effects of multiple audit committees

Cost of equity capital = number of public company audit committees an audit committee
member serves on + number of public company boards an audit committee member serves on +
(firm risk proxies (e.g., size, stock price return, leverage, growth) + audit committee
characteristics (e.g., size, number of financial experts) + corporate governance proxies (e.g.,
board independence, CEO duality) + financial reporting quality proxies (e.g., restatements,
internal control weaknesses, auditor size).
Sharma et al.’s (2020) data of the sample firms suggest on average, audit committee
members serve on 1.35 audit committees, are 63 years of age, have nearly eight years of tenure,
14 percent are female, and 30 percent are retired.
Results
Estimating the regression equation they find a consistently negative relationship – greater
number of audit committees served on is associated with a lower cost of equity capital. The
implication of this result is consistent with the reputational perspective that investors perceive
directors derive knowledge, expertise, and reputation from multiple audit committee memberships.
The regression results are also practically meaningful because serving on one additional audit
committee is associated with a 14 to 42 basis points reduction in cost of equity capital across the
various cost of equity measures. Serving on two additional audit committees would result in a
greater effect.
Sharma et al. (2020) probe further to explore whether at some point investors begin to view
additional audit committee directorship responsibilities as a potential threat to good governance.
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from multiple boards. The regression equation takes the form:
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They discover that, there is a turning point when a director serves on more than 2.5 audit
committees; three audit committees are too many. Sharma et al. (2020) next explore whether the
turning point varies based on the director’s employment status. Directors are categorized as either
retired or non-retired, where retired directors are individuals who do not hold an active full-time

have more time to devote to their governance duties compared to directors who have fulltime
employment commitments.
Their results reveal that investors perceive the optimal number of audit committees a retired
director on average should serve on is 3.5, and is 1.5 for currently employed directors. These
numbers suggest that investors perceive four audit committees are too many for retired directors,
while two committees are too many for currently employed directors. This discovery suggests that
both the reputational and busyness perspectives are at play when investors react to individual
directors simultaneously serving on multiple audit committees.
Further analyses indicate that investors also differentiate the role each director plays on the
audit committee. Sharma et al. (2020) examine three roles of directors on the audit committee –
financial expert, committee chair, and other members. Their results substantiate earlier findings
and suggest that audit committee experts and chairs drive the negative relationship between
multiple audit committee service and cost of equity. Investors are more concerned about directors
serving on multiple audit committees when they hold a key role on the committee that can
influence its effectiveness.
It could be that boards and nominating committees attempt to offset the potential negative
impacts of busy directors by appointing directors who are less busy. In other words, consistent
with the methodology of prior academic research, the average audit committee or board busyness
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employment position, other than as an independent director. Arguably, retired directors should
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may be more important to investors than is individual director busyness. Sharma et al. (2020) test
for this possibility by replacing their individual director-level measures with overall audit
committee and board-level measures. The overall measures are based on the average number of
audit committees and boards across all directors on the audit committee and board, respectively.

that investors are mostly concerned with the workload of individual directors and not with the
overall average for the audit committee or board of directors.
Conditions Affecting Relationship
Importantly, Sharma et al. (2020) also find that the negative relationship between an audit
committee director’s service on multiple audit committees and cost of equity capital is more
pronounced when financial reporting quality is high. In other words, when investors observe firms
with higher financial reporting quality have audit committee members that serve on multiple audit
committees, then they perceive that greater audit committee experience fosters relevant
governance experience, which manifests in investors demanding lower cost of equity capital. They
also observe that the negative effect of multiple audit committee memberships on cost of equity
capital is more evident when firms do not have a powerful CEO and the firm’s overall governance
environment does not compromise investors’ rights. Such findings suggest that investors perceive
an ineffective governance environment diminishes the governance experience directors gain from
serving on multiple audit committees. Collectively, these findings suggest that investors are aware
of the beneficial effects of a director serving on multiple audit committees and the conditions that
could enhance and undermine the effectiveness of the audit committee’s governance
responsibilities.
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They find that none of the measures of average multiple directorships is significant. They conclude
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
Over the last two decades, the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (U.S
House of Representatives 2002), the global financial crisis, and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (U.S.
House of Representatives 2010) significantly increased the responsibilities of the audit committee.

directors who serve on multiple audit committees. Some observers and commentators have called
for regulators to limit the number of audit committees an independent director can serve on.
Moreover, little is known of the capital markets’ perceptions of the ability of individual
independent directors to discharge their governance responsibilities when they serve on multiple
audit committees. Sharma et al.’s (2020) study informs these issues.
First, their results suggest that investors generally view service on multiple audit
committees as consistent with good governance. Because directors serving on multiple audit
committees garner knowledge, experience, and insights that can enhance their governance
effectiveness, investors reward such companies by demanding lower cost of equity. Second, when
directors serve on more than two audit committees, investors begin to become concerned,
measured as an increase in a firm’s cost of equity capital. Additionally, the number of audit
committees on which a director serves is less of a concern when the director is retired, and more
of a concern when the director is currently working. Too many audit committees is four for retired
directors and is two for currently employed directors. Sharma et al. (2020) further observe that
investors are more concerned when the designated financial expert or the chair of the audit
committee appear overburdened.
There are currently no regulations limiting the number of audit committees a director can
simultaneously serve on. Each individual board is responsible for ensuring directors have the time
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To overcome the scarcity of qualified independent audit committee directors, many firms appoint
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to devote to their governance responsibilities. This self-regulation has led to variations in practice
and strong investor and proxy advisor activism against directors holding multiple board seats. Most
existing guidelines of boards and the NYSE recommend serving on a maximum of four audit
committees simultaneously, but do not impose a limit (NYSE 2014). From the perspective of

the position held on audit committees, and the effectiveness of the firms’ governance, suggest that
blanket board and audit committee limit guidelines should be revisited.
The third important implication is that adopting a strategy of balancing individual audit
committee busyness does not appear effective, at least in terms of counterbalancing its negative
impact on the cost of equity capital. Investors are focused on an individual directors’ various
directorships and governance roles, and not on the committee and board as a whole.
Finally, Sharma et al.’s (2020) results have implications for researchers interested in
investigating the impacts of board and audit committee member characteristics on various market
outcomes. Rather than strictly considering overall or average board and audit committee
characteristics, researchers should also evaluate the impact of individual directors’ characteristics.
As proxy advisors and investors have begun to express concern about board member age, tenure,
ethnic diversity, and relevant expertise (e.g., Institutional Shareholder Services 2020)
investigations of these characteristics on the issues investigated by Sharma et al. (2020) and other
issues are ripe for exploration. As the regulations and board practices evolve, the findings from
prior multiple director studies and Sharma et al. (2020) warrant new research evidence to inform
policy makers and capital market participants.

8

Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/cia/article-pdf/doi/10.2308/CIIA-2021-009/2907304/ciia-2021-009.pdf by guest on 17 December 2021

investors, the findings of Sharma et al. (2020) relating to the employment status of the directors,

How Many Simultaneous Audit Committee Memberships Are Too Many?
REFERENCES

9

Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/cia/article-pdf/doi/10.2308/CIIA-2021-009/2907304/ciia-2021-009.pdf by guest on 17 December 2021

Ahn, S., P. Jiraporn, and Y. S. Kim. 2010. Multiple directorships and acquirers returns. Journal of
Banking & Finance 34 (9): 2011-2026. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.01.009
Barua, A., D. Rama, and V. D. Sharma. 2010. Audit committee characteristics and investment in
internal auditing. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 29 (5): 503-513.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2010.09.001
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71 (4): 443–465.
Business Roundtable (BRT). 2002. Principles of corporate governance survey, May 4–8.
Available
at:
https://www.businessroundtable.org/policy-perspectives/corporategovernance/principles-of-corporate-governance
Business Roundtable (BRT). 2003. Press release on the corporate governance survey highlights.
Available at: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20030715005526/en/BusinessRoundtable-Releases-Corporate-Governance-Survey-Increases
Cashman, G. D., S. Gillan, and C. Jun. 2012. Going overboard? On busy directors and firm value.
Journal
of
Banking
&
Finance
36
(12):
3248-3259.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.07.003
Dao, M., H. W. Huang, and J. Zhu. 2013. The effects of audit committee members’ age and
additional directorships on the cost of equity in the USA. European Accounting Review 22
(3): 607–643. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2012.739823
Deloitte. 2012. 2012 board practices report: Providing insight into the shape of things to come.
Available
at:
https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/risk/articles/2012-boardpractices-report.html
Dhaliwal, D., V. Naiker, and F. Navissi. 2010. The association between accruals quality and the
characteristics of accounting experts and mix of expertise on audit committees.
Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (3): 787-827. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.19113846.2010.01027.x
Fama, E., and M. Jensen. 1983. The separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law &
Economics 26 (2): 301–325. https://doi.org/10.1086/467037
Ferris, S., M. Jagannathan, and A. Pritchard. 2003. Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring
role by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance 58 (3): 1087–
1111. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00559
Fich, E., and A. Shivdasani. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance 61
(2): 689–724. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x
Field, V., M. Lowry, and A. Mkrtchyan. 2013. Are busy boards detrimental? Journal of Financial
Economics 109 (1): 63–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.004
Glass, Lewis & Co. 2018. Proxy paper guidelines: An overview of the Glass Lewis approach to
proxy advice-United States. Available at: https://www.glasslewis.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/US_Guidelines_2018.pdf
Institutional Shareholder Services. 2020. Americas: Proxy Voting Guidelines for 2021.
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/latest/updates/Americas-Policy-Updates.pdf

How Many Simultaneous Audit Committee Memberships Are Too Many?

10

Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/cia/article-pdf/doi/10.2308/CIIA-2021-009/2907304/ciia-2021-009.pdf by guest on 17 December 2021

National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). 2010. Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon
Commission on the Audit Committee. Washington, DC: NACD.
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). 2011. Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon
Commission on Director Professionalism. Washington, DC: NACD.
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 2014. NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303A.07:
Audit committee additional requirements. https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-companymanual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B0588BF4AD3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-75
Sharma, V. D., and E. R. Iselin. 2012. The association between audit committee multipledirectorships, tenure and financial misstatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice &
Theory 31 (3): 149–175. https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-10290
Sharma, D. S., V. D. Sharma, P. N. Tanyi, and X. Cheng 2020. Should audit committee directors
serve on multiple audit committees? Evidence from cost of equity capital. Auditing: A
Journal of Practice & Theory 39 (2): 185–205.
U.S. House of Representatives. 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Public Law No. 107–204.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
U.S. House of Representatives. 2010. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act. Available at: https://docs.house.gov/rules/finserv/111_hr4173_finsrvcr.pdf

